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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This memorandum is a summary of a 32 page study prepared by O’Connor and 
Company which sets forth the major legal issues in connection with the WTO 
legality of the EC’s sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) legislation as well as the 
traceability rules to come into force on 1 January 2005.   
 
The legislation concerned consists mainly of traceability requirements, 
conditions for  equivalency of the SPS standards of third countries and mutual 
recognition agreements. 
 
In conclusion, the study suggest that the EC legislation can be assumed to 
hinder trade, but it is not clear that all aspects of the rules are inconsistent with 
WTO rules. The study concludes that in order to challenge the traceability rules 
and those aspects of the SPS rules which are inconsistent with the WTO 
agreements the ACP group should take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by the current WTO rules and of a favourable negotiating context (the EPA and 
Doha negotiations), rather than pursuing WTO dispute settlement.   
 
 
2.  TRACEABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
2.1 EC Rules 
 
The general EC requirements on traceability are set out by Regulation 
178/2002/EC of 28 January 2002. Pursuant to this Regulation, these 
requirements will enter into force on 1st January 2005. 
 
The purpose of traceability rules is to enable targeted and accurate withdrawals 
of products in the food chain in the event of a sanitary crisis . Thus traceability 
requirements apply at all stages of production, processing and distribution. 
Operators must be able to identify the persons and undertakings from whom 
they purchase their products, but also those to which they supply. This 
information must be made available to the relevant authorities on demand. 
Furthermore, food or feed that is placed on the market must be adequately 
labelled or identified through relevant documentation.  
 
Prior to this Regulation, the EC implemented specific traceability regimes in the 
sectors of beef and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Beef is the object 
of Commission Regulation 1825/2000 of 25 August 2000. Its purpose is to avoid 
the spread of diseases such as  BSE and to protect the health and safety of 
consumers. Thus, operators must keep a complex identification and registration 
system for beef at each of the various stages of production and sales. Such 
system must be able to record the quantity of the cattle and provide a link 
between the cattle and the meat consumed. Passports, ear tags, computerised 
databases etc. must also be provided. With the exception of transporters, all 
movements, births and deaths of cattle must be recorded. The cattle and the 
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meat must also be appropriately labelled. A voluntary labelling scheme is 
proposed, as well as the recognition that the procedures and / or criteria applied 
in third countries are equivalent to the standards set out in Regulation 
1825/2000.  
 
As to GMOs, they are subject to a similar set of rules, in accordance with a 
Common position adopted by the Council on 17 March 2003. The purpose of 
the regime for GMOs is to facilitate the labelling of products consisting of, or 
containing, GMOs, in order to monitor their effects on the environment and to 
implement appropriate risk management measures. Operators must put in place 
systems and procedures to allow for the holding of necessary information and 
the identification of the parties to each transaction.  
 
 
2.2 TRADE ISSUES 
 
Needless to say these traceability requirements are burdensome for non-EC 
producers, particularly those in developing countries, where the production of 
small operators is often mixed before exportation. Record keeping obligations 
can also prove to be excessively difficult for them to comply with. The question 
is thus to what extent these requirements pursue a legitimate objective and are 
the least trade restrictive options available to pursue the desired objective. 
Indeed, if this condition is not satisfied,  these measures would constitute 
disguised restrictions to trade.   
 
Arguably, traceability requirements do pursue legitimate objectives. Indeed, 
they seem to be motivated by concerns of food safety, consumer protection and 
the consolidation of the EC internal market. The main question is thus whether 
they constitute unnecessary or disproportionate regulations hindering trade. 
Two WTO agreements are relevant in this regard: the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
 
The TBT Agreement recognizes the right for WTO Members to adopt the 
standards they consider appropriate, but imposes on them an obligation to 
pursue a legitimate objective (a non-exhaustive list of objectives is provided in 
this regard) and to ensure that the standards they adopt are the least trade 
restrictive measure available to achieve the objective sought. The application of 
international standards is also encouraged.  
 
The SPS Agreement regulates the adoption by Members of measures designed 
to "protect human or animal life or health …from risks arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuff". Among other rules, the existence of a risk must be assessed on the 
basis of scientific evidence, the measure must be connected to the risk 
identified and it must be the least trade restrictive measure reasonably available 
to overcome that risk. 
 
Arguably, the EC traceability requirements are subject to challenge under both 
agreements. In fact, the system in place for GMOs is already being challenged 
at the WTO by Australia, Canada, the United States and South Africa. Some of 
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the major allegations put forward are that this regime is not scientifically 
justified, unnecessary and not based on a coherent management of the risk in 
relation to non-GMO products. 
 
However a successful WTO dispute settlement challenge to the general 
traceability rules would have to be backed up with a particular fact situation to 
make the chance of success more realistic.  
 
Several developing countries have also complained before the TBT and the 
SPS Committees about the excessively burdensome nature of traceability 
requirements. The EC defended its position, arguing that these requirements 
are not more burdensome than those of general EC legislation or relevant 
international agreements, such as the Biosafety Protocol.  
 
In the context of developing country concerns, a key statement emerged in the 
relevant WTO committees: the EC is ready to consider requests from 
developing countries for technical cooperation and assistance to address 
identified priorities and needs. This indicates some willingness on the part of the 
EC to dedicate resources to enable operators of developing countries to comply 
with EC legislation. Some of the Community legislation itself confirms this point 
(see Article 13 of Regulation 178/2002). 
 
 
3. EQUIVALENCE 
 
3.1 THE CONCEPT AND TRADE ISSUES 
 
Standards for the maintenance of the health and safety of citizens are different 
in each country. They vary according to the particular risks that are prevalent in 
a particular region and according to consumer expectations. It may therefore 
not always be appropriate or possible to harmonise standards at a global level.  
Indeed, considering the peculiarity of each standard, requiring compliance with 
them and the procedures they entail for all imports of all countries may 
constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade. For example, it is useless to monitor 
the absence of a specific bacteria which is present only in humid regions for 
products originating in very dry regions.  
 
Equivalence implies that standards of one country are recognised by another 
country to be equivalent to its own standards. Equivalency does not mean that 
standards should be exactly the same. It only entails that two different 
standards are sufficient to overcome the same risk. Equivalence thus requires 
difficult scientific assessments of the effectiveness of the other’s standards and 
requires extensive resources. This is why so few equivalency agreements have 
been signed to date.  
 
Equivalence is addressed in both the SPS and TBT agreements. The SPS 
agreement contains more complete rules in this regard. Article 4 of this 
agreement requires WTO Members to recognise the equivalency of the 
standards of any Member that objectively demonstrates that its measures 
achieve the same level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection as the one they 
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require. The TBT Agreement also recognises the concept of equivalence in 
Article 2.7, but in a much weaker form. It only requires WTO Members to “give 
positive consideration” to requests of other Members.  In contrast to the SPS 
agreement, there is no obligation in the TBT agreement to recognize 
equivalence when conditions for it are met. 
 
The difficulty with the implementation of the SPS agreement is to determine 
what requirements are needed to satisfy the objective test of equivalence. 
Arguably, this would have to be based on science and the guidance provided in 
Annex C to the SPS Agreement, which gives details on control, inspection and 
approval procedures. For developing countries however, this is insufficient 
guidance. They need a more precise methodology so as to enable them to 
make objective and coherent judgements about whether the standards and 
systems in force in their territory are equivalent to the ones in exporting 
countries. The SPS Committee took a “Decision on the Implementation of 
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement”, which recognises the urgency for the 
development of such a methodology and which refers to the work ongoing in the 
other international agencies, such as the Secretariat of the International Plant 
Protection Convention, the International Office of Epizootics and the Codex 
Alimentarius.  General guidelines for equivalency have been adopted by these 
organisations. They all have a common trait, i.e. they call for importing countries 
to give positive consideration to the request by an exporting developing country 
for appropriate technical assistance to achieve an objective judgement of 
equivalence. 
 
 
3.2 THE EC PRACTICE 
 
In the EC, rules pertaining to the recognition of the equivalency of third 
countries’ SPS standards are contained in Directive 2000/29 of 8 May 2000, as 
amended by Council Directive 2002/89. This latter amendment is intended to 
implement Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and provides for equivalency rules in 
the EC regulation of SPS measures and standards. Pursuant to these rules, 
equivalency may be granted if EC experts in charge of inspection, testing and 
other relevant procedures in the third country concerned confirm that this 
country’s measures achieve the Community standard of phytosanitary 
protection. There are some examples showing that the Community authorised 
certain EC Member States to temporarily derogate from a general SPS 
standard on a specific products, such as, for instance seed potatoes. 
 
The EC has also concluded five bilateral equivalency agreements with third 
countries, one of which is a developing country (Chile). These agreements 
generally provide for a consultative process to be followed by the parties to 
reach a determination, on a case-by-case basis, of the conditions for 
equivalence. In some of these agreements, the sectors for which equivalence is 
already recognised by the parties are indicated. The most comprehensive 
provision in this respect is the one contained in the EC-Switzerland Agreement 
on trade in agricultural products signed on 21 June 1999. It provides that the 
Swiss and EC animal disease legislation are to be considered as being 
equivalent. 
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3.3 ALTERNATIVES TO EQUIVALENCY AGREEMENTS 
 
It is not always possible to reach comprehensive or even sectoral equivalency 
agreements. These negotiations are often lengthy and costly exercises, which 
require significant investments in terms of human resources and expertise. 
Alternatives have thus been recognized and explored by WTO Members. As a 
result, it is becoming more common for governments to recognize each other’s 
measures as applied to specific products. Thus ad hoc acceptance of 
equivalence is the practical alternative that tends to prevail. It does not require 
formal equivalency agreements. The matter is solved at the technical level, 
without any administrative burden, for a single product or for a single measure. 
From there, countries may then gradually move to more comprehensive and 
formal system-wide equivalency agreements. 
 
Another alternative is mutual recognition, i.e. the acceptance by an importing 
country that testing and control procedures in the exporting country are 
sufficiently effective. This leads to the elimination of inspection control of the 
goods at the point of entry to the importing country. This of course greatly 
facilitates trade. Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) can be product-
specific, requirement-specific or wider in scope. An interesting issue is that 
MRAs are of course governmental measures which fall under the scope of the 
WTO rules on non-discrimination (MFN and national treatment).  This implies 
that the advantages of mutual recognition must be available not only to the 
parties to the MRA, but also to all other WTO Members that can demonstrate 
that their systems meet the appropriate level of protection of any of the parties 
to the arrangement. This could enable a rationalisation of negotiating efforts for 
developing countries, by reaching individual bilateral MRAs with selected 
trading partners and then extending the benefits to all other developing 
countries with the same trade interests and the same ability to demonstrate 
equivalency of conditions, thus creating a sort of “domino effect”. 
 
 
3.4 THE IMPACT OF EQUIVALENCE ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The major difficulty for developing countries is not only to understand that 
equivalence is not sameness, but also to dedicate the resources necessary to 
exploit the opportunities offered by it. This is furthermore complicated by their 
poor scientific and technical infrastructure, which hinders their ability to 
negotiate equivalency agreements. Furthermore, there is a difference in 
approach: while developed countries seem to focus on the need to guarantee 
the technical and scientific precision of the determination of equivalence, 
developing countries struggle to ensure that such determination takes place so 
as to guarantee market access for their products. 
 
These difficulties are officially recognised, and WTO Members have agreed to 
“give full consideration” to requests by other WTO Members, especially 
developing countries, for appropriate technical assistance.   
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4. STRATEGIES 
 
First in the context of multilateral negotiations, developing countries could 
appeal for some form of an understanding, a decision, or a declaration to be 
adopted on equivalency at multilateral level. The Doha Round could provide the 
appropriate environment in this regard. In particular, a statement could be made 
that developing countries are entitled to be granted the opportunity to have 
access to the existing bilateral equivalency agreements between developed 
countries. Also, as a step further,  recognition of “equivalence to equivalency” 
could be requested, i.e. an obligation on WTO Members to immediately extend 
the benefits of an agreement on equivalency reached with any other exporting 
country to all WTO Members that, having had access the terms and conditions 
of the particular equivalency agreement, will have complied with its 
requirements and reformed their SPS regulation accordingly. Provision could 
also be made for expedient  negotiations and extension of the benefits of 
equivalency for those countries that are only interested in sectoral equivalence. 
 
Secondly, ad hoc negotiations on equivalency or MRAs could be conducted 
between ACP countries, individually or as a group, with the EC. The current 
negotiations aiming to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
could provide an adequate context for this purpose. Agreements reached could 
confer to ACP exporters a “comparative advantage” vis-à-vis the exporters of 
those countries that do not enjoy equivalency agreements with the EC, while at 
the same time being fully in compliance with WTO non-discrimination 
obligations. The opportunities offered by technical assistance activities should 
be exploited by ACP countries during these negotiations. 
 
Finally, while it appears difficult, albeit not impossible, to pursue WTO Dispute 
settlement against the EC rules on traceability and/or existing equivalency 
agreements, the preferred approach would be to engage the EC in plurilateral 
and bilateral negotiations. Coordination among developing countries could then 
help to maximize  the negotiating efforts and reach what has been described as 
the “domino effect” and the “equivalence of equivalency”.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of the following analysis is to examine whether certain aspects of 
the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) legislation of the European Community 
(i.e., traceability and equivalence rules) may be open to challenge under WTO 
rules or to re-negotiation by ACP Countries, whether by means of dispute 
settlement or through ongoing or future multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral 
negotiations (i.e., the Doha Round and the EPAs negotiations). 
 
The study is divided in three main sections: a part on traceability, one on 
equivalence, and one on possible strategies. 
 
The first section (i.e., Part 2) looks at the EC requirements for traceability, both 
in general terms and with respect to the two areas of regulation that have been 
dealt with by the EC, namely the beef sector and genetically modified 
organisms.  A review of the issues at stake for developing countries will be 
provided, together with an analysis of the relevant WTO provisions and EC 
obligations under the TBT and SPS Agreements. 
 
The second section (i.e., Part 3) looks at the EC provisions concerning the 
recognition as equivalent of third countries’ SPS measures.  WTO rules on 
equivalency and on the determination of equivalence will be reviewed ahead of 
a detailed analysis of the relevant EC provisions introduced by Directive 
2000/29/EC on protective measures against the introduction into the 
Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their 
spread within the Community. 
 
This sections also looks at the equivalency agreements so far concluded by the 
EC and provides a review of the alternatives to equivalency agreements under 
WTO and EC law.  Finally, the impact of equivalence on developing countries is 
assessed in light of the WTO discussions and relevant decisions. 
 
The third section (i.e. Part 4) looks at the possible strategies to advance 
developing countries interests and deal with the impact that the EC rules on 
traceability and equivalency have (or will have) on trade between the ACP 
Group and the EC.  A review of the available instruments to either challenge 
specific problems or negotiate “ad hoc” solutions, whether at bilateral, 
plurilateral or multilateral level, is provided. 
 
Final conclusions will then summarize the main legal considerations and the 
recommended actions. 
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2. TRACEABILITY 
 
2.1 The General EC Requirements on Traceability 
 
The general EC principles and requirements for traceability are set out by 
Regulation 178/2002/EC of 28 January 2002.1  This regulation, in particular, 
lays down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishes the 
European Food Safety Authority and lays down procedures in matters of food 
safety. 
 
However, it should be noted that, while Regulation 178/2002/EC entered into 
force on 21 February 2002, Article 65 thereof states that a number of articles, 
including Article 18 setting out the requirements for traceability, shall apply only 
as of 1 January 2005. 
 
The EC has considered it necessary to establish a system of traceability within 
food businesses so that targeted and accurate withdrawals may be undertaken 
or information may be given to consumers or control officials.  Traceability is 
also intended to avoid the potential for unnecessary wider disruption in the 
event of food safety problems. 
 
Traceability is defined by Article 3(15) of Regulation 178/2002 as: 
 
“the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal 
or substance intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a 
food or feed, through all stages of production, processing and 
distribution”. 
 
Article 18(1) of Regulation 178/2002 provides that the traceability of food, feed, 
food-producing animals, and any other substance intended to be, or expected to 
be, incorporated into a food or feed must be established at all stages of 
production, processing and distribution.2 
 
In particular, according to the second paragraph of Article 18 of Regulation 
178/2002, food and feed business operators must be able to identify any person 
from whom they have been supplied with a food, a feed, a food-producing 
animal, or any substance intended to be, or expected to be, incorporated into a 
food or feed. 
 
To achieve this goal, food and feed operators must have in place systems and 
procedures which allow for this information to be made available to the 
                                            
1 Regulation 178/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European 
Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31, 1/2/2002, 
p. 1.  
2 Some WTO Members argue against the definition of traceability provided by the EC.  It 
appears that, in the absence of an internationally agreed definition for traceability, the EC is 
entitled to its own definition and conceptual scope.  The food safety goals that are at the 
foundation of the EC traceability system and GMO labelling requirements seem to be 
adequately reflected in a system which is tailored around the EC concept of traceability, 
independently from its consistency with WTO rules and obligations.  
Traceability and Equivalency under EC and WTO Law 
 
 11 
competent authorities on demand.  Food and feed business operators must also 
have in place systems and procedures to identify the other businesses to which 
their products have been supplied (the so-called “forward traceability”). 
 
Paragraph 4 of Article 18 provides that, to facilitate this process of traceability, 
the food or feed which is placed on the market, or that is likely to be placed on 
the market in the EC, must be adequately labelled or identified through relevant 
documentation or information in accordance with the relevant requirements of 
more specific provisions. 
 
Finally, Article 18(5) refers to the legislative procedure that is to be followed to 
adopt the necessary provisions needed to apply the EC traceability 
requirements in respect of specific sectors.  As of this date, no sector-specific 
traceability systems have been adopted on the basis of Regulation 178/2002. 
 
Two areas of EC regulation, however, deserve a closer analysis.  In particular, 
specific traceability rules (which preceded Regulation 178/2002) have been 
adopted for the beef sector, while a new regulation on the traceability and 
labelling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has been adopted in July 
2003 and awaits official publication. 
 
 
2.2 Traceability Requirements in the Beef Sector 
 
Commission Regulation 1825/2000 of 25 August 2000 provides for detailed 
rules for the application of Regulation 1760/2000 as regards the labelling of 
beef and beef products.3  The main goal of these rules is to avoid the spread of 
diseases such as BSE and to protect health and safety of consumers.  
Traceability also aims at preventing the possibility that, with particular regard to 
sales between EC Member States, labelling could lead to distortions of trade in 
the beef and veal market. 
 
In order to ensure traceability of the products, the EC has deemed it necessary, 
in the context of both the compulsory and voluntary systems of beef labelling, 
that all operators or groups of operators (from the same or different parts of the 
beef trade) keep an identification system and a comprehensive registration 
system for beef, at each of their various stages of production and sale.  This 
requirement is provided by Article 1 of Regulation 1825/2000. 
 
This system must be applied in such a way as to ensure the link between the 
identification of the meat and the animal or animals concerned as provided by 
Regulation 1760/2000.  In particular, the registration system must record the 
arrival and departure of livestock, carcases and/or cuts to ensure that a 
correlation between arrivals and departures is guaranteed. 
                                            
3 Commission Regulation 1825/2000 of 25 August 2000 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Regulation 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
the labelling of beef and beef products, OJ L 216, 26/08/2000, p. 8 and Regulation 1760/2000 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the 
identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef 
products and repealing Council Regulation 820/97, OJ L 204, 11/08/2000, p. 1. 
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A key issue, in light of this analysis and of the commercial interests of 
developing countries, is the impact that the traceability system has (or might 
have) on imports of beef from third countries.  For this purpose, Regulation 
1760/2000 contains certain provisions that deal with those instances where the 
production of beef takes place, in full or in part, in a third country (both in terms 
of the compulsory and voluntary labelling systems). 
 
Article 3 of Regulation 1760/2000 provides that the system for identification and 
registration of bovine animals must include: 
• ear tags to individually identify animals; 
• computerised databases; 
• animal passports; and 
• individual registers maintained on the sites where the animals are 
held, kept or handled. 
 
All animals born after 1 January 1998, or intended for intra-EC trade after 1 
January 1998, must be identified by an ear tag applied in each ear.  Both ear 
tags must bear the same unique identification code which makes it possible to 
identify each animal individually with the holding4 on which it was born. 
 
Article 6 of Regulation 1760/2000 provides that every animal born after 1 
January 1998 must be issued with a passport within 14 days of the notification 
of its birth or, in the case of animals imported from third countries, within 14 
days of the notification of its re-identification by the Member State concerned.  
The animal passport must accompany the bovine each time that it is moved. 
 
With the exception of transporters, all keepers5 are required to keep a 
continuously updated register of cattle on their holdings.  Producers must report 
to the competent authorities6 all movements to and from the holding, and all 
births and deaths of animals on the holding, along with the dates of these 
events.  Each keeper must also be in the position to supply the competent 
authority, upon request, with all information concerning the origin, identification 
and, where appropriate, destination of animal, which he has owned, kept, 
transported, marketed or slaughtered. 
 
To allow for a truly reliable and complete traceability system (i.e., from farm to 
shelf), a compulsory beef and veal labelling system came into force on 1 
September 2000.  The rules apply at all points of sale in the supply chain, not 
just retail sales. 
                                            
4 Article 2 of Regulation 1760/2000 defines “holding” as “any establishment, construction or, in 
the case of an open-air farm, any place situated within the territory of the same Member State, 
in which animals covered by this Regulation are held, kept or handled“. 
5 Article 2 of Regulation 1760/2000 defines “keeper” as “any natural or legal person responsible 
for animals, whether on a permanent or on a temporary basis, including during transportation or 
at a market”. 
6 Article 2 of Regulation 1760/2000 defines “competent authority” as “the central authority or 
authorities in a Member State responsible for, or entrusted with, carrying out veterinary checks 
and implementing this title or, in the case of the monitoring of premiums, the authorities 
entrusted with implementing Regulation (EC) No 3508/92”. 
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With respect to products falling within the scope of the compulsory EC beef 
labelling system, Regulation 1760/2000 provides for the label to contain: 
• the reference number or reference code ensuring the link between 
the meat and the animal or animals; 
• the approval number of the slaughterhouse at which the animal or 
group of animals was slaughtered and the Member State or third 
country in which the slaughterhouse is established; 
• the approval number of the cutting hall which performed the cutting 
operation on the carcass or group of carcases; and 
• the indication of the Member State or third country in which the 
cutting hall is established. 
 
Article 13(4) of Regulation 1760/2000 expressly provides that such a 
compulsory system must not lead to any disruption of trade between the 
Member States.  Nothing is provided with respect to the potential for trade 
disruption vis-à-vis third countries. 
 
To this extent, Article 15 of Regulation 1760/2000 simply provides that, by way 
of derogation from the EC rules on compulsory labelling of beef, the beef 
imported into the EC, and for which not all the requested information is 
available, must be labelled with the indication “Origin: non-EC” and 
“Slaughtered in: (name of third country)”. 
 
In order to ensure that the labelling arrangements relating to imported beef are 
of equivalent reliability to those applicable to Community beef, the Commission 
is to examine the information notified by third countries.  Complete notifications 
must be transmitted to the EC Member States when the Commission reaches 
the conclusion that the procedures and/or the criteria applied in the third country 
concerned are equivalent to the standards set out in Regulation 1760/2000. 
 
A number of rules are provided by Regulation 1760/2000 on voluntary labelling 
system.  With respect to the production of beef that takes place, in full or in part, 
in a third country, operators and organisations are entitled to label beef 
according to voluntary labelling schemes if, in addition to complying with the 
general EC rules on voluntary labelling contained in Article 16 of Regulation 
1760/2000, they have obtained for their specifications the approval of the 
competent authority designated for that purpose by each of the third countries 
concerned. 
 
Article 17(2) of Regulation 1760/2000 provides that the validity within the EC of 
an approval granted by a third country is subject to prior notification by the third 
country to the Commission of: 
• the competent authority which has been designated; 
• the procedures and criteria to be followed by the competent 
authority when examining the specification; and 
• the details of each operator and organisation whose specification 
was accepted by the competent authority. 
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The Commission must transmit these notifications to the Member States. 
Where, on the basis of the above notifications, the Commission reaches the 
conclusion that the procedures and/or criteria applied in a third country are not 
equivalent to the standards set out in Regulation 1760/2000, the Commission 
must carry out consultations with the third country concerned and may decide 
that the approvals granted by that third country are not valid within the EC. 
 
In any event, it should be noted that Article 8(3) of Regulation 1825/2000 
provides that the Commission may at any time change its initial decision as 
regards equivalency of the procedures and/or criteria applied in the third country 
concerned. 
 
 
2.3 Genetically Modified Food 
 
A recent regulatory development has brought the EC a step closer to the 
adoption of a Community system for the traceability and labelling of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and of food and feed products obtained from 
GMOs.  On 22 July 2003, the EC adopted a Regulation (the GMOs Regulation) 
based on Common Position 21/2003 adopted by the Council on 17 March 
2003.7 
 
The GMOs Regulation will modify certain aspects of EC Directive 2001/18 on 
the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs8 and it will cover the 
overall chain of production and the commercial transactions that take place 
among different operators as regards traceability and labelling of GMOs.  
However, given the fact the GMOs Regulation has yet to be published (lacking 
the signature of the European Parliament’s President), our review will focus on 
the relevant language of Common Position 21/2003. 
 
The Common Position states that the GMOs Regulation aims to establish a 
framework for the traceability of products consisting of, or containing, 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and food and feed produced from 
GMOs, with the objectives of: 
• facilitating accurate labelling; 
• monitoring the effects on the environment and, where appropriate, 
on health; and 
• facilitating the implementation of the appropriate risk management 
measures. 
 
While EC Directive 2001/18 requires Member States to take measures to 
ensure traceability and labelling of authorised genetically modified organisms 
                                            
7 Common Position 21/2003 of 17 March 2003 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, with a view to adopting a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of 
food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 
2001/18/EC, OJ C 113, 13 May 2003, p. 21. 
8 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council 
Directive 90/220/EEC - Commission Declaration, OJ L 106, 17/04/2001, p. 1. 
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(GMOs) at all stages of their placing on the market, the Common Position 
acknowledges that differences between national laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions concerning traceability and labelling of GMOs, as well 
as traceability of food and feed produced from GMOs, may hinder their free 
movement, creating conditions of unequal and unfair competition. 
 
It is on that basis that the Common Position calls for the adoption of a 
harmonised EC framework for traceability and labelling of GMOs, in light of a 
better and more effective functioning of the internal market.  In particular, the 
Common Position states that traceability requirements for GMOs should 
facilitate both the withdrawal of products where unforeseen adverse effects on 
human health, animal health or the environment, including ecosystems, are 
established, and the targeting of monitoring to examine potential effects on, in 
particular, the environment. Traceability should also facilitate the 
implementation of risk management measures in accordance with the 
precautionary principle. 
 
Furthermore, the Common Position calls for the establishment of traceability 
requirements for food and feed produced from GMOs to facilitate the process of 
labelling of such products, so as to ensure that accurate information is available 
to operators and consumers and to enable them to exercise their freedom of 
choice in an effective manner.  Traceability is also intended to allow for a better 
control and verification of labelling claims. 
 
Article 3 of the Common Position provides all the relevant definitions for the 
purpose of the GMOs Regulation.  In particular, “traceability” is defined as: 
 
“the ability to trace GMOs and products produced from GMOs at all 
stages of their placing on the market through the production and 
distribution chains”. 
 
“Unique identifier” is defined as: 
 
“a simple numeric or alphanumeric code which serves to identify a 
GMO on the basis of the authorised transformation event from 
which it was developed and providing the means to retrieve specific 
information pertinent to that GMO”. 
 
Article 4 of the Common Position deals with traceability and the labelling 
requirements for products consisting of, or containing, GMOs.  With respect to 
traceability, it provides that, at the first stage of the placing on the market of a 
product consisting of or containing GMOs, including bulk quantities, operators 
must ensure that certain information is transmitted in writing to the operator 
receiving the product.  This information must indicate that the product in 
question contains or consists of GMOs and the unique identifier(s) assigned to 
those GMOs. 
 
At all subsequent stages of the placing on the market of these products, the 
operators must ensure that the information received is transmitted in writing to 
the operators receiving the products.  In the case of products consisting of or 
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containing mixtures of GMOs to be used only and directly as food or feed or for 
processing, the said information may be replaced by a declaration of use by the 
operator, accompanied by a list of the unique identifiers for all those GMOs that 
have been used to constitute the mixture. 
 
Finally, operators must have in place systems and procedures to allow for the 
holding of the necessary information and the identification, for a period of five 
years from each transaction, of the operator by whom and the operator to whom 
the particular products have been made available. 
 
As for the labelling requirements, Article 4 of the Common Position provides 
that, with respect to products consisting of or containing GMOs, operators must 
ensure that certain language appears on the labels.  For pre-packaged products 
consisting of, or containing GMOs, the words “This product contains genetically 
modified organisms” or “This product contains genetically modified (name of 
organism(s))” must appear.  For non-pre-packaged products offered to the final 
consumer, the words “This product contains genetically modified organisms” or 
“This product contains genetically modified (name of organism(s))” must appear 
on, or in connection with, the display of the product. 
 
It should be noted that certain exemptions apply with respect to products that 
contain traces of GMOs in a proportion not higher than given thresholds, 
provided that these traces of GMOs are adventitious (accidental) or technically 
unavoidable.  In particular, products need not be labelled if “adventitious or 
technically unavoidable presence” of authorised GMOs is less than 0.9 
percent.9 
 
Finally, Article 5 of the Common Position establishes a number of traceability 
requirements for products for food and feed obtained from GMOs.  Paragraph 1 
thereof provides that, when placing products produced from GMOs on the 
market, operators must ensure that certain information is transmitted in writing 
to the operator receiving the product. 
 
The indication of each of the food ingredients which are produced from GMOs 
and the indication of each of the feed materials or additives which are produced 
from GMOs must be given.  Furthermore, in the case of products for which no 
list of ingredients exists, a special indication stating that the product is produced 
from GMOs is required. 
 
 
2.4 The Issues at Stake 
 
The main reason behind the introduction by the EC of a system of traceability is 
food safety.  Recent outbreaks of diseases and health threats to consumers and 
animals have indicated the urgency for the establishment of a system that will 
                                            
9 It should also be noted that, with respect to the “adventitious or technically unavoidable 
presence” of non-authorised GMOs, there will be a three-year transitional period during which a 
0.5 percent presence will be tolerated without labelling, as long as the GMO in question has 
received a positive scientific risk assessment. 
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allow swift reaction and effective countermeasures to limit the spread of 
diseases or dangerous food and safeguard consumers’ health and confidence. 
 
Experience has also shown that the functioning of the internal market can be 
jeopardised where it is impossible to trace food or where different traceability 
systems apply at Member States’ level.  In particular, the internal market may 
be disrupted if, on one side, a product needs to be withdrawn and a traceability 
system is missing or, on the other side, if traceability or labelling systems exist 
but are not harmonised among EC Member States. 
 
The latter situation is not just a theoretical possibility.  Italy, for example, which 
imports about one third of its milk, introduced in July 2003 a new labelling 
system requiring that milk production facilities indicate on the label the location 
of the farm where the milk originated, to enable consumers to trace the milk 
they purchase from the dairy farm to the grocery store.10  As a second example, 
the UK has introduced statutory requirements for traceability in the sector of 
fishery products.11  These systems are not matched by other Member States. 
 
The EC considers it necessary to establish a system of traceability within food 
businesses so that targeted and accurate withdrawals can be undertaken or 
information given to consumers or control officials, thereby avoiding the 
potential for unnecessary wider disruption in the event of food safety problems. 
 
All EC food operators, including importers of ACP products, will have to comply 
with these requirements.  It is not obvious that these provisions infringe the 
EC’s commitments within the WTO and therefore traders will have to adapt to 
them if they want to continue selling onto the EC market. 
 
The questions relating to the WTO compatibility of the EC’s traceability rules 
centre around the issue of whether the imposition of these requirements is 
disproportionate to the aim that is being sought by the EC or not. Could 
something less restrictive be implemented?  Some countries have argued in this 
direction and special references have been made to the needs of developing 
countries. 
 
Also, there is nothing in the EC’s rules dealing with the issue of “mixage”.  
Mixing is a common feature in trade from developing countries.  Often individual 
farms or producers are not able to make exportable quantities.  In this 
situations, mixing will take place in markets or in warehouses.  It seems 
arguable that the failure of the EC to cater for this circumstance stands as a 
breach of its proportionality obligations. 
 
Another core problem with respect to traceability is, for small scale producers, 
the question of the burden of “record-keeping”.  Both these problems may result 
in an effective barrier to EC market entry when the traceability requirements 
become obligatory as of 1 January 2005. 
 
                                            
10 Source: Agra Europe, EU Food Law August 2003. 
11 Source: UK Food Standards Agency (FSA). 
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It is clear that the EC traceability requirements could prove excessive for 
developing countries’ producers to comply with and could amount to an 
excessively burdensome measure.  Is the EC within its rights to do so?  What 
are the WTO obligations that the EC has to comply with? 
 
There does not appear to be any WTO law or policy which prohibits a 
requirement to have a traceability system in place as a pre-requisite for the 
importation into the EC of food or feed products.  That being said, any system 
would have to comply with certain WTO requirements and specific provisions of 
some WTO Agreements. 
 
 
2.5 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) tries to ensure 
that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures do not create 
unnecessary obstacles.  The TBT Agreement recognizes the right for WTO 
Members to adopt the standards they consider appropriate to protect, for 
example, the environment or to meet other consumer interests.  The procedures 
used to decide whether a product conforms with national standards have to be 
fair and equitable and any such methods should not give domestically-produced 
goods an unfair advantage. 
 
According to the TBT Agreement, WTO Members must ensure that technical 
regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect 
of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For this purpose, 
technical regulations may not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective. 
 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of legitimate 
objectives and provides that they include, inter alia: 
• national security requirements; 
• the prevention of deceptive practices; and 
• the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment. 
 
Technical regulations are, by nature, mandatory. They have different 
implications for international trade. If an imported product does not fulfil the 
requirements of a technical regulation, it will not be allowed to be put on sale. 
 
In recent years, the number of technical regulations and standards adopted by 
countries has grown significantly.  The increase in consumers’ demand for safe 
and high-quality products has resulted in extensive regulation.  Most of these 
regulations aim at protecting consumers through information, mainly in the form 
of labelling requirements.  Other regulations include classification and definition, 
packaging requirements, and measurements (i.e., size, weight, etc.), so as to 
avoid deceptive practices.   
 
Other objectives of the regulations may be quality, technical harmonization, or 
simply trade facilitation.  Technical regulations and standards provide the 
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specific characteristics of a product (such as its size, shape, design, functions 
and performance, or the way it is labelled or packaged before it is put on sale). 
 
Sometimes much depends on the way in which a product is produced and it 
may result more appropriate to draft technical regulations and standards in 
terms of a product’s process and production methods rather than its 
characteristics per se.  The TBT Agreement allows both these approaches. 
 
Depending on the actual objectives (i.e., not necessarily the declared ones) that 
a traceability system is set up to achieve, a review to determine its consistency 
with the TBT Agreement might result necessary.  In general terms, it is crucial 
to determine whether the objective sought qualifies as a “legitimate objective” 
under the TBT Agreement. 
 
The application of the TBT Agreement to the EC traceability system for food 
and feed is already a matter of discussion among WTO Member countries.  
Some argue that only the TBT should apply.  Others that only the SPS 
Agreement is the relevant body of laws for a WTO scrutiny.  Another group 
considers that both agreements are relevant.  This last approach seems to be 
the sounder one. 
 
 
2.6 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
 
To the extent that a traceability system is designed to impose a health or safety 
standard, the standard (or even the traceability system itself) may be subject to 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement). 
 
This is, for example, the consideration made by Australia, Canada and the US 
in asking that the EC notify its GMOs Regulation and the proposal for a 
traceability and labelling system for GMOs to the WTO SPS Committee and not 
only to the TBT Committee.  These might seem mere procedural and formalistic 
skirmishes, but they have far-reaching consequences. 
 
When regulatory measures are taken by governments because human, animal, 
or plant life or health are jeopardized by pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms, additives, contaminants or toxins, it is the SPS Agreement and not 
the TBT Agreement which applies. 
 
In the case at stake, it seems fairly clear that the proposed EC regulation is 
also, in whole or in part, a measure defined as a sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure under the WTO (i.e., one applied, among other things, “to protect 
human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs”, as provided by Article 1 of Annex A to the SPS 
Agreement). 
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If any trade-restriction results from the introduction or application of such 
measures, the SPS Agreement requires that they be scientifically justified and 
based on appropriate and transparent risk assessment procedures. 
 
Some WTO Members have argued that the system proposed by the EC for 
GMOs traceability is contrary to the SPS Agreement in that it is not scientifically 
justified, it is excessively burdensome, and it is more trade-restrictive than 
required to achieve the appropriate level of SPS protection. 
  
Australia, for example, has indicated its concern that the EC traceability 
proposal is not founded on a scientific basis.  According to Australia, the 
traceability system proposed by the EC includes not only mechanisms for 
traceability of food, but also for the two more restrictive and stringent practices: 
identity preservation and segregation.  Australia considers that traceability is a 
separate issue from identity preservation and segregation and that traceability 
should be addressed separately. 
 
South Africa voiced the opinion that a risk assessment of GMOs and food 
produced from them, is the most important aspect before placing the products 
on the market.  Should a system to trace any unforeseen risks be required for 
GMOs and food containing genetically modified (GM) ingredients, the same 
argument and perhaps even stronger arguments could be developed for 
conventional food and foods that are not subject to comprehensive risk 
assessments.  The EC would be discriminating against GM food without a 
sound scientific justification. 
 
The US noted that the potential trade burdens imposed by the EC proposal 
would be particularly heavy for suppliers in developing countries.  The US 
consider that this is especially troublesome given that the proposal does not 
appear to respond to identified risks or hazards and is being implemented on 
products that have already undergone a risk assessment and have been 
approved for use. 
 
In a similar way, Canada argues that the EC regulations attempt to respond to 
unidentified risks.  According to Canada, there is no scientific or medical 
evidence that suggests that foods obtained through biotechnology, which have 
been assessed and approved under an internationally recognized approach, 
such as those developed by the OECD and FAO/WHO, are any less safe than 
their conventional counterparts. 
 
On this basis, Canada questioned the necessity of the proposed tracing and 
mandatory labelling requirements given that the proposed requirements will 
apply to biotech-derived products that have been approved for human and 
animal consumption, and environmental release, through well established 
pre-market assessments. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that Australia, Canada and the US have all argued that 
the EC proposed system is more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the 
appropriate level of SPS protection.  In particular, these countries challenge the 
apparent failure by the EC to consider alternative measures that could meet the 
Traceability and Equivalency under EC and WTO Law 
 
 21 
stated objectives in a less trade-restrictive fashion and through less trade-
distortive options.  For example, Canada questiones the EC approach to 
recommend mandatory labelling and traceability measures over a less 
restrictive, market-driven approach, such as voluntary labels.  
 
 
2.7 General Considerations 
 
Independently from their regulatory soundness and WTO consistency, there are 
some immediate operational disadvantages to traceability systems.  The 
problem of “mixage” is one of them.  Raw agricultural commodities are often 
mixed shortly after harvest.  This is done so as to build small quantities into 
exportable quantities.  “Mixage” takes places either in cooperatives or trade 
warehouses or in markets. 
 
Maintaining the quality of traceability through “mixage” systems is not easy.  
The requirement to know the processes to which a raw material has been 
subjected can limit the number of potential suppliers to those with the size to 
have traceability systems in place.  Small scale producers often cannot 
guarantee the provision of traceability or the record keeping on the maintenance 
of standards which goes with it. 
 
In general, in fact, traceability systems favour large scale producers and 
vertically-integrated enterprises.  The amount of information which must be 
stored and available for immediate review is considerable.  If the traceability 
system is being introduced as a means of showing that certain standards are 
being met, then it is necessary to be in a position to show how those standards 
are being implemented. 
 
Undoubtedly, these are additional costs to most market operators and possibly 
prohibitive ones for developing countries’ exporters and producers.  It is easier 
to manage traceability systems within single enterprises where the information 
is available in a single format to all participants in the production process from 
seed to farm to consumer.  
 
During the TBT and SPS Committee discussions on the EC proposed system of 
traceability and labelling for genetically modified food and feed12, a number of 
very interesting questions arose.  Some of them deserve a specific reference in 
that they go to the heart of the problem that might be faced by developing 
countries. 
 
Beside the discussions over the objective of the EC proposal and the scientific 
basis for traceability, an important element of debate has been the issue of 
implementation of traceability and the potential for it to result in a trade barrier. 
 
Argentina, for example, claimed that some of the rules contained in the EC 
proposed system of traceability and labelling for GMOs would be very difficult to 
implement and extremely burdensome for developing countries.  The EC replied 
                                            
12 See WTO Documents G/SPS/GEN/338 and G/TBT/W/180 of 26 July 2002. 
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that the obligatory information requirements foreseen by the EC proposal are in 
most cases required either under European Community law or normal 
commercial transactions.  The only additional element is that this information 
will have to be transmitted to all operators in the commercial chain within the 
European Community. 
 
The EC also referred to Article 18 of the Biosafety Protocol concerning trans-
boundary movements of living modified organisms (LMOs), which provides, 
inter alia, that GMOs for intentional introduction into the environment have to be 
accompanied by documentation that specifies their identity and relevant traits 
and characteristics.  This clearly requires some form of unique identification for 
individual GMOs. The EC maintained that, to date, more than 120 countries, 
many of which are developing countries, have signed up to the Biosafety 
Protocol, including the requirements of Article 18 thereof.13 
 
However, the key statement by the EC referred to the fact that the European 
Commission is ready to consider requests from developing countries for 
technical co-operation and assistance to address identified priorities and needs. 
 
South Africa, on the issue of technical guidance on sampling, commented that 
there would be many shortcomings in a traceability system as a way to verify 
labelling claims as described by the EC proposal.  South Africa claimed that this 
could be even more so for developing countries.  In its reply, the EC 
emphasized again that the European Commission is ready to consider requests 
from developing countries for technical co-operation and assistance to address 
identified priorities and needs. 
 
It should be noted that this stand by the Community does not seem to be only a 
convenient “lip service” for political and diplomatic purposes.  Article 13 of 
Regulation 178/2002 on international standards, in fact, expressly mentions the 
EC commitments towards its international obligations vis-à-vis developing 
countries. 
 
It first states that the Community and the Member States must contribute to the 
development of international technical standards for food and feed and sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards, promote the coordination of work on food and 
feed standards undertaken by international governmental and non-
governmental organisations, and contribute, where relevant and appropriate, to 
the development of agreements on recognition of the equivalence of specific 
food and feed-related measures. 
 
In addition, and most importantly for purposes of this analysis, it emphasizes 
that the EC and its Member States must give particular attention to the special 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, with a view to 
ensuring that international standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
exports from developing countries. 
 
                                            
13 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety entered into force on 11 September 2003, for further 
information consult http://www.biodiv.org. 
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This declaration of intents must be fully utilized by developing countries to make 
sure that their interests are adequately taken into consideration when the EC 
system of traceability and labelling for food and feed will enter into force and its 
“side effects” will be felt especially by developing countries’ producers and 
exporters. 
 
 
 
3. EQUIVALENCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
An underlying assumption to the SPS Agreement is the recognition that different 
WTO Members will impose different standards for the maintenance of the health 
and safety of their citizens.  The reasons for these differences vary, but two 
common themes can be identified.  Firstly, a standard will be set in one Member 
where particular risks are prevalent due to geographic or climate conditions 
while this standard would not be appropriate in other places.14  Secondly, 
standards will be set on the basis of consumer expectations. 
 
The drafters of the SPS Agreement sought to address the issue of different 
standards by encouraging WTO Members to harmonise their health and safety 
rules wherever possible.  Where this was not possible, the SPS Agreement 
provides that WTO Members should seek to agree that different standards are 
equivalent to their own.  
 
The number of equivalency agreements which have so far been concluded 
between WTO Members is limited.  This is due to a number of different factors, 
including the relative novelty of the SPS Agreement, the lack of resources in 
exporting Members (especially developing countries) to request equivalence, 
and the reluctance of importing Members to accept the idea of equivalence and 
abandon certain border controls. 
 
A further difficulty has been an understanding of what exactly equivalence 
means.  There has been a tendency among some WTO Members to consider 
that equivalence means sameness.  This is clearly not the intention of Article 4 
of the SPS Agreement.  The idea of equivalence presumes difference, not 
sameness. 
 
Another tendency has been to require that some form of equivalent measure be 
in place in the exporting Member.  But should this be the case?  It is easy to 
imagine the situation where a sanitary or phytosanitary risk is prevalent in an 
importing Member and not even present in the exporting Member.  The 
importing Member will have elaborate standards to deal with the risk while the 
exporting Member will have no measures at all.  Can there be equivalency in 
the absence of a measure in the exporting Member?  
 
                                            
14 Even where the same risk occurs in different places different standards may be appropriate 
depending on the geographic circumstances of the country.  
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The answer to this questions is to be found in the shape and object of the SPS 
Agreement itself.  The object of the SPS Agreement is to facilitate trade by 
ensuring that SPS measures are based on objective criteria and sound science.  
If no risk is present in the exporting Member and this view is based on science, 
then Article 4 of the SPS Agreement can be safely interpreted as to allow 
equivalence even in the absence of a measure. 
 
 
3.2 Equivalence in WTO Law 
 
Equivalence is a mechanism for minimising barriers to trade by treating different 
standards as having a similar effect while allowing them to remain intact and in 
effect.  Equivalence in this sense is, ultimately, nothing else than the agreement 
among trading partners recognizing that their different standards achieve 
comparable results in terms of health protection. 
 
The WTO as a whole promotes the concept of equivalence.  Equivalence is 
provided for in both the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)  and in the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).  Article 4 of the SPS Agreement, in 
particular, provides that: 
 
1. “Members shall accept the sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
of other Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ 
from their own or from those used by other Members trading in 
the same product, if the exporting Member objectively 
demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures 
achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection. For this purpose, reasonable access 
shall be given, upon request, to the importing Member for 
inspection, testing and other relevant procedures. 
 
2. Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the 
aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
recognition of the equivalence of specified sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures”. 
 
The text of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement is, to a large degree, very clear. The 
obligations on WTO Members are mandatory.  If a WTO Member can 
objectively demonstrate the appropriate level of SPS protection, an importing 
Member must accept the exporting Members’ SPS measures as equivalent. 
The crucial factor for determining equivalence is whether the “appropriate level 
of protection” is demonstrated to exist “objectively”. 
 
What is not necessarily clear in the SPS Agreement itself is what requirements 
are needed to satisfy the “objective” test of equivalence.  There is no annex to 
the SPS Agreement setting out how WTO Members should demonstrate 
equivalence.  That being said, it is clear that, in the light of the object of the SPS 
Agreement itself, an objective test of equivalence would have to be based on 
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science and demonstrable along the lines of Annex C to the SPS Agreement 
which gives details on control, inspection and approval procedures. 
 
The TBT Agreement recognizes the concept of equivalence in Article 2.7, but in 
a much weaker form as compared with the SPS Agreement.  Article 2.7 of the 
TBT Agreement provides that: 
 
“Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these 
regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that 
these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own 
regulations”.  
 
This provision is clearly less of a burden on WTO Members.  Firstly, it does not 
impose any substantial obligation on importing Members. The importing 
Member must only give positive consideration to proposals of equivalence. 
Secondly, the determination of equivalence is premised on the subjective 
criterion (i.e., “satisfaction” of the importing Member).  Accordingly, the practical 
implications of the equivalency concept in the context of the TBT Agreement 
have so far been rather limited. 
 
 
3.3 Determination of Equivalency 
 
With the principle of equivalence playing such a crucial role in world trade, it is 
evident that further international guidelines are needed for its systematic 
application.  Importing countries need a methodology which will allow them to 
make objective and coherent judgements about whether the standards and 
systems in force in the exporting countries are equivalent to their own internal 
requirements. 
 
Under the Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement, 
the SPS Committee recognized the urgency for the development of guidance on 
the judgement of equivalence and encouraged the IPPC15 and the OIE16 to 
draw up guidelines on equivalence of SPS measures and especially the Codex 
to complete its work with regard to equivalence.17   
 
The Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 
Systems18 adopted in 2002 the “Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence of 
Sanitary Measures Associated with Food Inspection and Certification 
                                            
15 The FAO’s Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, FAO web page on 
http://www.fao.org, “Agriculture”, “Plant Production and Protection Division” (AGP), “Plant 
Protection Service” (AGPP), “International Plant Protection Division”. 
16 International Office of Epizootics, OIE web page on http://www.oie.int, “OIE: Overview of the 
OIE, missions, organization, structures and operations”. 
17 See the WTO document G/SPS/19 of 26 October 2001. 
18 The Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems 
(CCFICS) is charged with developing principles and guidelines for food import and export 
certification systems.  Recognition of quality assurance systems through the development of 
guidelines will help ensure that foods conform to the essential requirements. See 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/ccfics. 
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Systems”19 (the Guidelines) and proposed “Draft Guidelines on the Judgement 
of Equivalence of Technical Regulations Associated with Food Inspection and 
Certification Systems”.20  The preambles to the Guidelines recognise the 
principle of equivalence as intention to facilitate trade while ensuring that the 
importing country’s legitimate objectives are met.21 
 
Both documents contain general principles for the determination of equivalence, 
the steps to be followed in the procedure for the determination of equivalence 
and the principles upon which the judgement of equivalence by the importing 
country should be based. 
 
The Guidelines recognise that importing and exporting countries often operate 
different food inspections and certification systems.  The reasons for such 
differences include: 
• differences in prevalence of particular food safety hazards; 
• national choice about management of food safety risks; and  
• differences in the historical development of food control systems. 
 
Both documents urge countries, wherever possible or appropriate, to base their 
requirements on Codex or other international norms as the means of achieving 
their desired level of quality22 and regulatory conformity for domestically 
produced and imported food. 
  
A similar document has been submitted by the International Office of Epizootics 
(OIE) to the SPS Committee on 19 June 2003.23  The OIE adopted “Guidelines 
for Reaching a Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures”, which are 
meant to assist OIE Member countries to determine whether sanitary measures 
arising from different animal health and production systems may provide the 
same level of animal and human health protection. 
 
It is important to notice that a common trait to all these sets of guidelines calls 
for importing countries to give positive consideration to the request by an 
exporting developing country for appropriate technical assistance that would 
facilitate the successful completion of a judgement of equivalence. 
 
 
3.4 Equivalency under Directive 2000/29 
 
Beside the actual provisions of the various equivalency agreements entered into 
by the EC, particular relevance must be given to the EC provisions concerning 
the recognition as equivalent of third countries’ phytosanitary measures 
contained  in Directive 2000/29 of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against 
the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant 
                                            
19 ALINORM 01/30A, Appendix III, CX/FICS 02/4; see http://www.codexalimentarius.net. 
20 Ibid., CX/FICS 02/5. 
21 The Preamble to the Draft Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence of Technical 
Regulations states, in relevant part, that the “Application of the principle of equivalence has 
mutual benefits for both exporting and importing countries”. 
22 The term “quality” as used in this guideline includes food safety. 
23 See the WTO document G/SPS/GEN/406 of 19 June 2003. 
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products and against their spread within the Community24 (as amended by 
Council Directive 2002/89).25 
 
In particular, Directive 2002/89 of 28 November 2002 was adopted to amend 
Directive 2000/29 in light of certain EC and international developments.  One of 
these developments was the increased pressure on the Community to provide 
for equivalency rules in its regulation of SPS measures and standards. 
 
Directive 2002/89 clearly states this obligation by emphasizing that, under 
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement, the Community must recognise, under certain 
conditions, the equivalence of phytosanitary measures of other Parties to the 
SPS Agreement.  The procedures for such recognition in the field of plant health 
have been specified in Directive 2000/29 through amendments brought by 
Directive 2002/89. 
 
In relevant part, Article 1 of Directive 2002/89 amended Article 15 of Directive 
2000/29 by adding that the phytosanitary measures adopted by a third country 
for export into the Community must be recognised as equivalent to the 
phytosanitary measures laid down in Directive 2000/29 (in particular, to those 
specified in Annex IV thereof), if that third country objectively demonstrates to 
the Community that its measures achieve the Community’s appropriate level of 
phytosanitary protection and if this is confirmed by the conclusions resulting 
from findings made by the EC experts in charge of inspection, testing and other 
relevant procedures in the relevant third country. 
 
Article 1 of Directive 2002/89 also amended Article 15 of Directive 2000/29 by 
establishing that, upon request by a third country, the Commission must enter 
into consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral or multilateral agreements 
on recognition of the equivalence of specified phytosanitary measures. 
 
For each individual case, the exporting countries have to officially indicate in 
writing that they are in compliance with the conditions laid down by Directive 
2000/29.  Only on the basis of this written notification may the EC issue a 
decision providing for derogations from the requirements of Directive 2000/29 or 
granting the recognition of equivalence. 
 
A number of Community decisions have been taken on the basis of Directive 
2000/29 to the extent of banning or limiting importation of plant products 
originating in third countries when faced with the risk of spreading harmful 
organisms to the EC market.  It is virtually impossible to review their legality 
absent specific indications that the decision was taken without scientific 
justification and simply on the basis of protectionist objectives. 
 
                                            
24 Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction 
into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread 
within the Community, OJ L 169, 10/07/2000, p. 1, as subsequently amended. 
25 Council Directive 2002/89/EC of 28 November 2002 amending Directive 2000/29/EC on 
protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants 
or plant products and against their spread within the Community, OJ L 30/12/2002, p. 45. 
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It is clear, however, that this WTO scrutiny is always available to exporting 
countries and that the SPS Agreement provides the necessary instruments to 
challenge trade-restrictive measures that are not based on science or on risk 
assessment. 
 
On the other hand, some Community decisions have provided derogations from 
certain provisions of Directive 2000/29 that would otherwise prohibit importation 
of specific products originating in selected countries.  One such example is the 
Commission Decision of 27 January 2003 authorising certain Member States to 
provide for temporary derogations in respect of seed potatoes originating in 
certain provinces of Canada.26 
 
In this case, the EC decision allowed Member States with a warmer and dryer 
climate (such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) to permit imports of seed 
potatoes originating in Canada, despite the fact that their importation is not 
authorised by the rest of the EC.  This decision was based on the fact that in the 
wet and cold regions of the EC (i.e., in all EC Member States but Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) the risk of establishing and spreading the particular harmful 
organism affecting Canadian seed potatoes was too high, while it was below the 
acceptable level of risk in the dry and warm EC regions. 
 
Independently from the technical and scientific reasons behind the import 
prohibitions or the derogations to a specific trade ban, it is important to notice 
that all these measures have significant implications under WTO and EC law.  
Fundamental WTO non-discrimination rules and EC free-movement of goods 
principles will provide powerful instruments of scrutiny.  Exporting countries will 
have a strong case if the EC is not able to show that its particular measure is 
scientifically justified. 
 
 
3.5 Equivalency Agreements Entered by the EC 
 
It is somewhat difficult to know the total number of the existing equivalency 
agreements that come within the matters regulated by the SPS Agreement 
since not all have been published.27  The EC has so far concluded five 
equivalency agreements.28  Only one of them has been reached with a 
developing country, and only as part of a broader bilateral trade agreement. 
 
One such agreement is the EC-US Veterinary Equivalency Agreement.29  This 
agreement was signed on 20 July 1999 and entered into force on 1 August 
                                            
26 Commission Decision 2003/61/EC of 27 January 2003 authorising certain Member States to 
provide for temporary derogations from certain provisions of Council Directive 2000/29/EC in 
respect of seed potatoes originating in certain provinces of Canada (notified under document 
number C(2003) 334), OJ L 23, 28/01/2003, p. 31. 
27 Only Australia, Canada, the European Community, New Zealand, Switzerland, Thailand and 
the United States have reported the conclusion of equivalence agreements.  
28 In addition, the EC is currently negotiating equivalency agreements on veterinary measures 
with Brazil, Mercosur and Mexico. 
29 Agreement between the European Community and the United States on sanitary measures to 
protect public and animal health in trade in live animals and animal products, OJ L 118 of 21 
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1999.  It has the objective of facilitating trade in live animals and animal 
products by establishing a mechanism for the mutual recognition of the 
equivalence of both countries’ sanitary measures. 
 
Article 7 of the EC-US Veterinary Equivalency Agreement refers to equivalence.  
It provides for a consultative process to be followed by the parties to reach a 
determination of whether a sanitary measure maintained by the exporting party 
achieves the importing party’s appropriate level of sanitary protection. 
 
Annex V of the EC-US Veterinary Agreement lists the live animals and animal 
product areas or sectors on which this agreement is focused.  For each area or 
sector, it sets out the status of consultations regarding the recognition of 
equivalence of a party’s sanitary measures and the applicable trade conditions.  
Annex V also provides two columns which state the rules for the recognition of 
equivalence of products for EC exports to the US and vice versa.  However, the 
agreement does not list many actual agreements of equivalency on specific 
standards. 
 
A second agreement is the EC-Canada Veterinary Equivalency Agreement30 of 
17 December 1998.  The EC and Canada concluded this agreement to regulate 
trade in live animals, animal products, fish and fish products.  The EC-Canada 
Veterinary Agreement outlines a process for achieving recognition of the 
equivalence of sanitary measures between Canada and the EC. 
 
Article 6 of the EC-Canada Veterinary Agreement deals with equivalence.  It 
provides that the importing party has to recognize a sanitary measure of the 
exporting party as equivalent if the exporting party objectively demonstrates that 
its measure achieves the importing party’s appropriate level of protection. 
 
Once determined, equivalence has to be applied in relation to individual or 
groups of sanitary measures for live animals or animal product sectors. It also 
has to be applied in relation to legislation, inspection and control systems, or in 
relation to specific legislation, inspections and/or hygiene requirements. 
 
Article 7 of the EC-Canada Veterinary Agreement provides the criteria for the 
recognition of equivalence and sets out a process, to be followed by both 
parties, for the determination of whether a sanitary measure maintained by an 
exporting party achieves the importing party’s appropriate level of sanitary 
protection.  Where the equivalence is not recognized, the conditions for trade 
are those required by the importing party. 
 
Annex V of the EC-Canada Veterinary Agreement lists those sectors, or parts of 
sectors, for which, at the date of the entry into force of the agreement, the 
parties’ respective sanitary measures are recognized as equivalent for trade 
                                                                                                                                
April 1998, 98/258/EC (Council Decision of 16 March 1998 on the conclusion of the 
Agreement).  
30 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on sanitary 
measures to protect public and animal health in respect of trade in live animals and animal 
products, OJ L 071 of 18 March 1999, (Council Decision of 14 December 1998 on the 
Conclusion of the Agreement).    
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purposes.  It also includes those sectors, or parts of sectors, for which, at the 
same date, the parties apply different sanitary measures and have not yet 
concluded the process of equivalency. 
 
A third agreement of this kind is the EC-New Zealand Veterinary Equivalency 
Agreement.31  This agreement was concluded on 17 December 1996 and deals 
with the sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal 
products. 
 
Article 7 of the EC-New Zealand Veterinary Equivalency Agreement provides 
conditions for the recognition of the equivalence of the two parties’ sanitary 
measures and Article 8 sets out the steps that should be accomplished to 
determine equivalence.  
 
Annex V of the EC-New Zealand Veterinary Equivalency Agreement contains 
the detailed list of all products for which the party’s respective sanitary 
measures are recognized as equivalent for trade purposes and the products for 
which the respective sanitary measures require additional conditions to be 
equivalent. 
 
A fourth equivalency agreement has been reached by the EC within the 
framework of the bilateral trade negotiations with Switzerland.  It is the EC-
Switzerland Agreement32 on trade in agricultural products signed on 21 June 
1999.  One of the seven agreements concerns trade in agricultural products.  
Appendix 11 of the agricultural agreement (i.e., “Health and animal breeding 
measures, which are applicable to trade in live animals and products of animal 
origin”) states that the Swiss and EC animal disease legislation are to be 
considered as being equivalent. 
 
This is the most comprehensive provision of all the equivalency agreements.  
The others can be considered agreements on how to agree on equivalence.  
The EC-Switzerland Agreement on trade in agricultural products sets out 
provisions on equivalence regarding the exports of products such as animal 
feed, organically produced agricultural products, milk and products of milk of 
bovine species intended for human consumption, and animal waste. 
 
Another equivalency agreement reached as part of a broader bilateral 
negotiation is the agreement between the EC and the Czech Republic.33  
                                            
31 Agreement between the European Community and New Zealand on sanitary measures 
applicable to trade in live animals and animal products,  OJ L 057 of 26 February 1997, (Council 
Decision of 15 November 1999 amended Decision N 97/132/EC on the Conclusion of the 
Agreement, OJ L 332 of 23 December  1999). 
32 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Carriage 
of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road (Final Act) Joint Declarations - Information relating 
to the entry into force of the seven Agreements with the Swiss Confederation in the sectors free 
movement of persons, air and land transport, public procurement, scientific and technological 
cooperation, mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, and trade in agricultural 
products, OJ L 114, 30/04/2002, p. 91. 
33 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part - Protocol 1 on textile 
and clothing products - Protocol 2 on ECSC products - Protocol 3 on trade between the Czech 
Republic and the Community in processed agricultural products not covered by Annex II to the 
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Council Decision 98/250/EC of 20 October 199734 adopted the Europe 
Agreement’s Protocol on Sanitary, Phytosanitary and Animal Welfare Measures 
in Relation to Trade between the EC and its Members and the Czech Republic 
(the Protocol).  The aim of the Protocol is to facilitate trade between the 
Community and the Czech Republic. 
 
The scope of the Protocol is limited to the animal, public and plant health 
conditions and animal welfare measures related to trade between the parties in 
live animals, animal products, plants and plant products.  Article 5 thereof deals 
with equivalence and states that parties have to recognize as equivalent those 
measures, whether or not identical, that provide the same level of health 
protection and animal welfare in trade.  Equivalence in the area sanitary or 
phytosanitary legislation is to be applied on a sectoral basis. 
 
Annex V to the Protocol lists the live animals and animal products, plants and 
plant products areas, sectors, or parts of sectors, with which the agreement is 
concerned and sets out the status of the consultations regarding the recognition 
of equivalence for trade purposes. 
 
The only equivalency agreement reached so far with a developing country 
appears to be the EC-Chile Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Applicable to Trade in Animals and Animal Products, Plants, Plant 
Products and Other Goods and Animal Welfare.35  This agreement was 
concluded in 2002 and forms integral part of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement 
between the EC and Chile. 
 
Article 1 of the EC-Chile Agreement states that the objective of the agreement 
is to facilitate trade in animals and animal products, plants, plant products and 
other goods between the Parties, while at the same time safeguarding public, 
animal and plant health. 
 
To reach this goal, the parties must act, inter alia, to ensure full transparency as 
regards SPS measures applicable to trade and to establish a mechanism for the 
recognition of equivalence of such measures maintained by a Party consistent 
with the protection of public, animal and plant health.  Mechanisms and 
procedures for trade facilitation should also be established. 
                                                                                                                                
EEC Treaty - Protocol 4 concerning the definition of the concept of originating products and 
methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol 5 on specific provisions relating to trade 
between the Czech Republic, of the one part, and Spain and Portugal, of the other part - 
Protocol 6 on mutual assistance in customs matters - Protocol 7 on concessions with annual 
limits - Protocol 8 on the succession of the Czech Republic in respect of the exchanges of 
letters between the European Economic Community (Community) and the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic concerning transit and land transport infrastructure (Final Act) Joint 
Declarations, OJ L 360, 31/12/1994, p. 2. 
34 Council Decision 98/250/EC of 20 October 1997 on the conclusion of a Protocol concerning 
sanitary, phytosanitary and animal welfare measures in relation to trade to the Europe 
Agreement between the European communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Czech Republic, of the other, OJ L 106 of 6 April 1998. 
35 See Annex IV of the Agreement Establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Chile, on the other part 
(Final Act); Official Journal L 352, 30/12/2002. 
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Article 7 of the EC-Chile Agreement deals with equivalency and provides that 
equivalence may be recognised in relation to an individual measure and/or 
groups of measures and/or systems applicable to a sector or sub-sector.  In the 
determination of equivalence, the Parties must follow a consultation process 
based on the objective demonstration of equivalence by the exporting Party and 
the objective assessment of this demonstration by the importing Party, with a 
view to possibly recognising equivalence. 
 
 
3.6 Alternatives to Equivalency Agreements 
 
It is not always possible to reach comprehensive  or even sectoral equivalency 
agreements.  These negotiations are often lengthy and costly exercises which 
require big investments in terms of human resources and technical expertise.  
For this reason, alternatives have been recognized and explored by WTO 
Members. 
 
The discussions among WTO Members within the SPS Committee clearly 
indicate that formal equivalency agreements covering countries’ entire health 
and safety systems are rare even among developed countries.  This is largely 
due to the fact that formal agreements are technically very complicated, time-
consuming to negotiate, and often result in market access improvements which 
are deemed too modest to make the effort worthwhile. 
 
For this reasons, it is becoming more common for governments to recognize 
each other’s SPS measures as applied to specific products.  Ad hoc acceptance 
of the equivalence of specific products or of certain technical aspects related to 
SPS measures, is becoming a practical alternative to the broader and more 
formal agreements.  This acceptance of equivalence often occurs at technical 
level and is not necessarily reflected in any formal bilateral agreement.  This is 
an important element of trade facilitation. 
 
The SPS Committee has agreed that equivalence does not necessarily require 
formal equivalency agreements, but can be achieved at the technical level (i.e., 
equivalence for a specific product or of a particular sanitary and phytosanitary 
measure) as a first step.  This should particularly benefit developing countries, 
in that their exports are often concentrated in a limited number of products and 
involve few enterprises. 
 
The SPS Committee has noted that a possible approach to address the issue of 
the heavy “administrative burden” that comes with the negotiation of 
equivalency would be the acceptance, as a first step, of equivalence at the 
technical level for a single product or measure.  When necessary and 
appropriate, countries could then gradually move to more comprehensive and 
formal system-wide or broad-ranging equivalency agreements.36 
 
                                            
36 See the WTO document G/SPS/W/111 of 4 July 2001. 
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Another alternative to formal equivalency agreements is mutual recognition.  
This is the outcome of a process of evaluation which leads to an agreement 
among countries that the standards employed in their respective territories are 
such as to allow goods produced in one country to be freely marketed in the 
other(s). 
 
Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) contribute to facilitate trade by reducing 
or eliminating the need for inspection control of goods at the point of entry to the 
importing country, relying instead on the effectiveness of control systems in the 
exporting country. 
 
MRAs facilitate trade by enabling manufacturers to have their products tested 
and certified, in the country of origin, for compliance with the regulatory 
requirements of the importing country.  This effectively eliminates or greatly 
reduces the time delays and costs associated with obtaining regulatory approval 
in the importing country. 
 
Mutual recognition may apply to all foods traded between countries which are 
party to an agreement or only to specified foods, and all requirements 
applicable to specified foods (including food standards) or only some (such as 
conformity assessment procedures). Countries may elect to enter into an 
“umbrella agreement” consisting of general provisions and specific sectoral 
arrangements.  
 
One important consideration in relation to MRAs, at least for those countries 
that are WTO Members, is that countries are obliged to conform to the 
principles of national treatment and non-discrimination.  Accordingly, the 
advantages of mutual recognition must be available not only to the parties to an 
MRA, but to all other WTO Members that can demonstrate that their standards 
and/or systems meet the appropriate level of protection of any of the parties to 
the arrangement. 
 
This should have an obvious element of appeal for developing countries.  In 
fact, they could rationalize their negotiating efforts by reaching individual 
bilateral MRAs with selected trading partners and then extend the benefits, by 
virtue of a sort of “domino effect”, to all other developing countries with the 
same trading interests and the ability to demonstrate that their own standards 
meet the appropriate level of protection agreed by the parties to the MRA. 
 
One of the principal differences between formal equivalency agreements and 
mutual recognition agreements is that, on the one hand, the equivalency 
agreements constitute a one-way recognition of measures,37 whereas MRAs 
presuppose a two-way recognition and flow of goods.  In addition, MRAs can 
take several forms.  They may be limited to testing methods and cover only the 
conformity assessment certificates, or they may be comprehensive agreements 
that include the standards themselves. 
                                            
37 One important basic element of equivalence is the idea of a one-way recognition: New 
Zealand may accept that Philippine mangoes subject to heat treatment are “equivalently” safe 
from fruit fly as those subject to methyl bromide fumigation, but that does not mean that the 
Philippines will necessarily accept mangoes from New Zealand. 
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Another key difference between formal equivalency agreements and mutual 
recognition agreements is that, while equivalency agreements establish the 
recognition of the equivalence of the measures (therefore obliging the producer 
to comply with the appropriate level of protection of the country of origin to then 
to be able to export its products to the importing country), MRAs are based on a 
reciprocal determination of equivalence, and therefore the producer can meet 
the required standards by undergoing a single inspection, testing, or certification 
procedure by approved bodies in whatever country is most convenient. 
 
 
3.7 The Impact of Equivalence on Developing Countries 
 
As indicated in the sections above, developing countries have so far played a 
small role in the negotiation and adoption of equivalency agreements.  
Developing countries maintain that often importing countries are looking for 
“sameness” of measures instead of equivalence. 
 
While the international community has attempted to overcome the trade-
distortive effects of SPS measures through the SPS Agreement, many 
developing countries still lack the resources necessary to exploit the 
opportunities offered by it.  This certainly reflects the relatively poor scientific 
and technical infrastructure existing in many developing countries, but it is first 
and foremost a result of their inability to devote the necessary resources to 
demand and negotiate such agreements. 
 
To this extent, reference must be made to the Decision taken on 24 October 
2001 by the SPS Committee, in order to overcome the difficulties that WTO 
Members (especially developing countries) encounter when trying to implement 
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement.38  This Decision provides certain guidelines 
and emphasizes some of the issues of main concern to developing countries, 
such as the need for technical assistance and transparency. 
 
Argentina has well summarized the discontent of developing countries in a 
communication submitted to the SPS Committee.39 With respect to the 
determination of equivalence, Argentina claimed that the needs of developing 
countries differ from the ones of developed countries.  While developing 
countries focus on the need to ensure that the determination of equivalence 
guarantees market access, developed countries focus on the need to guarantee 
the technical and scientific precision of the determination of equivalence. 
 
Another interesting claim was made by India during the informal consultations 
ahead of the 8-9 November 2000 meeting of the SPS Committee.  India, in 
particular, stated that developing countries have to be provided with the 
opportunity to have access to the existing bilateral equivalency agreements 
between developed countries.  India further stated that WTO Members should 
be obliged to notify to the SPS Committee any bilateral agreements on 
                                            
38 See the WTO document G/SPS/19 of 26 October 2001. 
39 See the WTO document G/SPS/GEN/268 of 15 August 2001. 
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equivalence of SPS measures so that developing countries could study them 
and forge similar agreements. 
 
The WTO General Council has requested the SPS Committee to examine the 
developing country Members’ concerns, in relation to the Decision on the 
Implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement of 24 October 2001.40  
 
The request is the official acceptance by all WTO Members of the need to carry 
out further efforts to eliminate the difficulties that developing country Members 
encounter in having the equivalence of their sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
accepted by importing countries.  It is not yet clear how this particular objective 
will be achieved especially in view of the increased concern with food safety 
among the governments of many developed Members, but it is nevertheless an 
important declaration of intent.  
 
It should be noted that the Decision on the Implementation itself refers to 
technical assistance, as provided in Article 9 of the SPS Agreement.  In 
particular, it states that WTO Members have to give full consideration to 
requests by other WTO Members, especially developing countries, for 
appropriate technical assistance to facilitate the implementation of Article 4 of 
the SPS Agreement. 
 
Similarly, the Decision of the Ministerial Conference in Doha on 14 November 
2001 took note of the Decision of the SPS Committee regarding equivalence 
and instructed the SPS Committee to develop expeditiously the specific 
programme to further the implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement.41 
 
 
 
4. STRATEGIES 
 
4.1 Multilateral Negotiations 
 
The SPS Agreement has not been listed as one of the issues for negotiation in 
the Doha Development Agenda.  In the aftermath of the Ministerial Conference 
in Cancun, it is difficult to say what will happen to the current round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, but it is safe to assume that WTO Members will 
continue negotiating on the basis of the agenda and of the proposals so far put 
forward. 
 
The EC negotiating approach has tried to link the multifunctional role of 
agriculture, the relationship between trade and environment, consumer 
protection, as well as human, plant and animal health.  In particular, the EC has 
proposed a re-examination of certain agreements, such as the SPS Agreement, 
which have been used both to legitimately guarantee safety measures and to 
remove protectionist non-tariff trade barriers. 
 
                                            
40 See the WTO document G/SPS/19 of 26 October 2001. 
41 See the Doha Ministerial Conference Decision “Implementation-related issues and concerns” 
(WT/MIN(01)/17), para. 3.3. 
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A number of countries support the position of the EC42, while others maintain 
that this should be discussed in the SPS and TBT Committees and not within 
the framework of the agricultural negotiations. 
 
Whatever the forum, it appears that developing countries could legitimately 
appeal for some sort of an understanding, or a decision or a declaration to be 
adopted on equivalency at multilateral level.  The Doha Round could provide 
the adequate environment for such a development to occur. 
 
The proposal could develop out of the idea first circulated by India that 
developing countries be provided with the opportunity to have access to the 
existing bilateral equivalency agreements between developed countries 
(together with the technical and legal negotiating instruments used to achieve 
them) so to be able to reach similar agreements. 
 
The idea would be to take this suggestion a step further and to call for a specific 
provision to be adopted on the concept of “equivalence to equivalency”.  WTO 
Members would have to immediately extend the benefits of an agreement on 
equivalency reached with any other exporting country to all WTO Members that, 
having had access to the terms and conditions of the particular equivalency 
agreement, will have complied with its requirements and reformed their SPS 
regulation accordingly. 
 
This solution will greatly benefit all WTO Members, but especially developing 
countries, in so far as they are the ones normally suffering from the hardships of 
equivalency negotiation and the lack of resources that they can commit to such 
processes. 
 
Provision could also be made for expedited negotiations and extension of the 
benefits of equivalency for those countries that are only interested in sectoral 
equivalence.  They could “cherry-pick” certain provisions of the broad and 
comprehensive equivalency agreements reached by other countries and 
demand extension to their products (obviously after a process of regulatory 
compliance has been completed). 
 
 
4.2 Bilateral Agreements 
 
Bilateral agreements on equivalency or on the mutual recognition of SPS 
standards could either be the result of “ad hoc” negotiations or take place within 
the context of the ongoing trade negotiations between the EC and the ACP 
Group of Countries. 
 
“Ad hoc” bilateral negotiations would have to be called by single ACP countries 
or by the EC and would have to be either broad equivalency agreements (i.e., 
regarding most or all SPS standards applied to the food sector or to entire 
sectors of agricultural trade) or sector-specific agreements confined to specific 
commodities of interest to the parties.  In both cases, they would require 
                                            
42 See the WTO document G/SPS/GEN/132 of 21 July 1999. 
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considerable resources in terms of the time needed, of the experts and 
negotiators involved, and of the financial contributions required. 
 
Under the trade provisions of the Cotonou Agreement,43 the EC and the ACP 
Group of Countries agreed to start negotiations on a WTO compatible ACP 
trade arrangement by September 2002.44  These negotiations began on time 
and are currently taking place.  They aim at reaching Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs).  EPAs will cover trade related areas. 
 
A positive development that could arise from the EPAs negotiations would be 
the discussion and agreement between the EC and the ACP countries of 
specific SPS equivalency agreements.  These agreements would have a 
considerable effect of trade facilitation and would confer to ACP exporters (to 
the EC) a “comparative advantage” vis-à-vis the exporters of those countries 
that do not enjoy equivalency agreements with the EC, while at the same time 
being fully in compliance with WTO non-discrimination obligations. 
 
During the EPAs negotiations, mutual recognition agreements for various 
standards could also be the object of bilateral negotiations.  The differences 
between equivalency agreements and MRAs have been indicated.  The benefits 
of MRAs (i.e., sectoral application and more flexible and effective approach) 
would make these solutions highly appealing and advisable.  They would 
represent a “tailor-made” solution for developing countries that are often only 
interested in selected products and very narrow market-access improvements. 
 
Whatever the negotiating approach taken by developing countries, WTO and 
EC provisions expressly call for technical assistance and special treatment to 
be accorded by the EC.  That should come not only in terms of negotiating 
resources, but also in the form of “special and differential treatment”, expedited 
negotiations, reduced administrative burdens and, to the extent possible, 
replication and extension of the results obtained during other similar 
equivalency or MRA negotiations. 
 
 
4.3 Dispute Settlement 
 
WTO dispute settlement is always a hard choice for any Member to make.  It is 
often used as an additional element to bring to the negotiating table, but it 
always comes at a considerable price: diplomatic at international level, political, 
commercial and financial at domestic level, where local constituencies will often 
have contrasting interests and will seldom agree on “footing the bill” of WTO 
litigation. 
 
In addition, WTO dispute settlement requires that specific and possible sound 
legal allegations be identified to bring an effective challenge.  Despite the fact 
that legal arguments can almost always be found to allow a claim, developing 
                                            
43 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 
signed in Cotonou, Benin, on 23 June 2000.  See www.acpsec.org/gb/cotonou/accord1.htm. 
44 Cotonou Agreement, Article 37.1. 
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countries will need to show prima facie evidence that certain EC regulations or 
measures are inconsistent with WTO obligations and provisions. 
 
This seems a very difficult task with respect to the EC measures on equivalency 
and the “comparative trade advantages” that the EC is conferring to those 
countries with which it has reached equivalency agreements or MRAs.  There is 
no immediate showing of WTO illegality on the side of the Community. 
 
The only imaginable situation where this could happen is the one where a WTO 
Member has exactly the same SPS measures that have been declared 
equivalent to the ones of the EC in an equivalency agreement entered by the 
Community and yet is not granted equivalency or the chance to enter 
equivalence negotiations.  That appears to be a remote possibility, but it would 
be one where the discrimination by the EC could be easily challenged and 
addressed through WTO dispute settlement procedures. 
 
On the other hand, with respect to the current and proposed EC traceability 
systems (i.e., for beef and GMOs), the issue of WTO compatibility essentially 
focuses on whether or not the imposition of the EC traceability requirements is 
disproportionate to the aim that is being sought by the EC. 
 
Depending on the actual objectives that a traceability system is set up to 
achieve, a WTO scrutiny to determine its consistency with the TBT and SPS 
Agreements might result necessary.  In general terms, it will be crucial to 
determine whether the objective sought qualifies as a “legitimate objective” 
under the TBT Agreement and whether the EC measures are scientifically 
justified and based on appropriate and transparent risk assessment procedures, 
as required by the SPS Agreement. 
 
While no objection has so far been voiced to the extent that the EC objective is 
not a “legitimate objective” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, a number 
of accusations have already been made vis-à-vis the WTO consistency of the 
EC traceability system for GMOs and GM food in light of the SPS Agreement. 
 
In particular, some WTO Members have argued that: 
• the EC traceability proposal is not scientifically justified; 
• the EC proposed regulations are discriminatory in that there is no 
scientific or medical evidence to suggest that foods obtained 
through biotechnology are any less safe than their conventional 
equivalents; 
• the potential trade burdens imposed by the EC proposal would be 
too heavy for suppliers in developing countries; 
• the EC proposal does not appear to respond to identified risks or 
hazards and is being implemented on products that would have 
already been approved for use after undergoing a risk assessment; 
• the EC proposed system is more trade-restrictive than required to 
achieve the appropriate level of SPS protection; and 
• the EC failed to consider alternative measures that could meet the 
stated objectives in a less trade-restrictive manner. 
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So far, these allegations have not been backed by actual evidence and it is 
difficult to say whether these arguments would be easy to prove should the EC 
adopt the proposed measures and any WTO Member decide to bring a 
challenge under WTO dispute settlement mechanisms.  Certainly the 
arguments of the lack of scientific justification, the lack of proportionality of the 
measure, the trade-restrictive nature and the lack of an appropriate risk 
assessment are powerful allegations, but would still have to be adequately 
backed by corroborating evidence. 
 
The legal grounds for the WTO inconsistency of the EC traceability system (in 
as much as it is an SPS measure and not just a TBT one) could be found in a 
number of provisions of the SPS Agreement.  In particular, the arguments 
indicated above could be interpreted as full or partial breaches of Articles 2.2, 
2.3, 5.1, 5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.  Essentially, it could be argued, on 
the basis of these legal grounds, that the EC traceability system is not based on 
scientific principles, it is applied in a manner which constitutes a disguised 
restriction on international trade, it is not based on appropriate risk assessment, 
it does not minimize negative trade effects, and it is more trade-restrictive than 
required to achieve the appropriate level of SPS protection. 
 
In any event, it seems as if the ACP Countries would have a difficult task in 
pursuing an effective litigation on this matter, even if merely for political and 
negotiating purposes. 
 
It appears as if the ACP Group could benefit more from negotiation than from 
outright litigation.  Negotiation could lead to the adoption of specific exceptions 
or more favourable conditions for developing countries when the EC will go 
ahead with the proposed changes to its SPS regulation of labelling and 
traceability. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
On the basis of the analysis conducted and of the elements of general interests 
to the ACP Group of Countries, it appears that the preferred approach would be 
to engage the EC in multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral negotiations to secure 
favourable rules on both traceability and equivalence. 
 
The appropriate negotiating fora could be provided by: 
• the Doha Round agricultural negotiations (multilateral level); 
• the EC-ACP negotiations in the framework of the EPAs negotiations 
(plurilateral and bilateral level); and 
• country-specific initiatives to reach comprehensive or sectoral 
equivalency agreements or MRAs with the EC (bilateral level). 
 
Given the complexity of the negotiations and the lack of available resources, the 
preferred avenue should be the negotiation of agreements at the plurilateral and 
bilateral levels.  Coordination among developing countries could then help 
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maximizing the negotiating efforts and reaching what have been described as 
the “domino effect” and the “equivalence to equivalency”. 
 
Dispute settlement should only be used as a last resort, unless particular 
situations make it essential and necessary.  Single countries or specific sectors 
might be affected in disproportionate ways by the EC rules on traceability and 
equivalency and that discrimination could require WTO litigation. 
 
•   •   • 
 
